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Abstract. This paper analyzes data protection challenges and possible solutions 
associated with the usage of the blockchain (BC) technology from the perspective 
of 94 German companies and organizations. This paper clusters 537 data 
protection-relevant statements into three subject areas: (1) relevance of data 
protection in BC, (2) articulated challenges and (3) proposed solutions. Each 
group is then collated with insights from computer science. The results show that 
a majority of the respondents do see data protection issues with using BC, which 
mainly relate to data erasure and identifying the data controller. However, the 
majority also consider these problems to be solvable utilizing already available 
technologies, e.g. off-chain storage, encryption, pseudonymization or usage of 
private BCs. Comparing these proposals with the findings in computer science 
literature shows that especially off-chain storage, encryption and redactable 
blockchains can be regarded as adequate solutions.  
Keywords: Blockchain, Data Protection, Protection of Personal Data, Privacy, 
Content Analysis 
1 Introduction 
Distributed ledger technologies (DLT) use decentralized data storage on the computers 
of many users. One variant is the blockchain (BC) technology, which has become one 
of the top five strategic decisions for many companies worldwide [1]. Since BC has 
gradually been approaching commercialization [2], the discussion concerning an 
appropriate regulatory framework has also recently gained momentum worldwide. The 
data protection requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) are the 
most important regulatory challenge in the European Union (EU). Among the various 
data protection (DP) challenges, the following two are the most serious for BC 
applications: the difficulty of identifying the data controller, and the DP implications 
of the immutability of the data stored in a blockchain [3]. 
Companies expect disruptive changes and economic gains if BCs are operated in 
compliance  with data protection [e.g. 4]. Therefore, an intensive debate is ongoing in 
academia, industry and regulatory authorities on the compatibility of BC applications 
with the data protection framework [5–7]. Although this debate is intensive, it lacks 
 
 
empirical evidence of how stakeholders actually assess the DP challenges. Research in 
this area generally focuses on two strands. First, there are studies which only ask 
companies whether they perceive regulations such as DP as an obstacle. Second, there 
is intensive research, particularly from a legal and technical perspective, into solutions 
to DP challenges (see Section 2.2).  
Several research gaps can be identified here. The analyses of DP challenges usually 
remain on an abstract level (in the sense of: is regulation/data protection considered an 
obstacle to the use of blockchains in your company?). Quantitative analyses are missing 
of the concrete data protection-related challenges that companies face. In addition, 
surveys among companies generally do not enquire whether they consider solutions to 
the challenges possible.  
Thus, our study aims to find out whether and how companies and organizations are 
trying to overcome these challenges. Since there is a lack of quantitative analyses of 
the possible solutions being discussed, computer science research also lacks analyses 
of the usefulness of such proposed solutions. Against this background, we ask the 
following research questions: 
 RQ1: What challenges and possible solutions do stakeholders see with 
regard to data protection and blockchain issues? 
 RQ2: How are the proposed solutions to be evaluated from a technical point 
of view? 
We answer these questions in two steps. To answer RQ1, we rely on a text-based 
qualitative content analysis of the statements of 130 actors who participated in the 2019 
blockchain consultation of the German government. To answer RQ2, we assess the 
challenges articulated and the proposed solutions based on state of the art technical BC 
research in computer science literature.  
Our study has implications for academia, practitioners and policy makers by 
providing qualitative insights into how companies and organizations evaluate the DP 
challenges and solutions concerning BC technology.  
2 State of Research 
2.1 Background of Blockchain Technology 
DLT are a type of database with globally decentralized data storage across multiple 
computers, so-called nodes [8]. Each node has a partial or full copy of the ledger and 
can interchange data formally as a peer-to-peer network without a central authority [9]. 
Blockchain is a DLT, but consolidates new data into blocks, which are chained to the 
preceding one by means of cryptographic hash functions [10]. This results in an append-
only structure, where prior blocks cannot be deleted or edited without changing all the 
subsequent blocks. If something tries to change a block, the corresponding hash value 
changes, resulting in a breakage of the chain [8]. As every node has a copy of the ledger, 
tampering with a single node cannot manipulate the blockchain. This should ensure full 
transparency and traceability. This consensus mechanism is, however, only possible for 
financial data, as the nodes check whether the total amount, e.g. of Bitcoins, is still 
 
 
valid after a transaction. This is to ensure that no one can transfer coins they do not 
own. In public BCs, nodes are unknown and there is no administrator. In contrast, 
permissioned/private or consortium BCs have one or a group of known nodes with 
special rights able to grant access to new users (such as nodes, miners or programmers) 
and thus control the BC. 
The concept emerged during the global financial crisis in 2008, when an author with 
the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto introduced the crypto currency Bitcoin to provide 
non-manipulable financial transactions on the internet by avoiding intermediaries, e.g. 
financial institutions [9, 10]. The term “blockchain” only appeared 2013, but the 
underlying technology of storing chained hash values of documents already existed in 
1991 [9].  
2.2 Data Protection in Blockchain Technologies 
The EU considers data protection a fundamental right (see Art. 8 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU) and strives for economic growth (see Recitals 2 and 7 
GDPR). Consequently, the GDPR aims to guarantee a high and harmonized level of 
data protection for the personal data of EU citizens on the one hand, and to strengthen 
the digital single market by removing obstacles that impede the free movement of 
personal data on the other (see Recitals 9 and 10 GDPR.). The GDPR represents a 
comprehensive and complex set of rules with which these goals are to be achieved. A 
wide range of provisions must be complied with in order to ensure that personal data is 
processed in accordance with data protection regulations. These include the material 
and territorial scope, the definition of personal data, the rules on the lawfulness of 
processing, the rights of the data subject, and the obligations of the data controller. The 
GDPR has two requirements that stand out in particular for blockchain applications.  
First, Art. 4 (7) GDPR is based on the assumption that one or more relatively clearly 
identifiable data controllers are responsible for the processing operation, and against 
whom the data subject can assert his or her DP rights. However, the technical mode of 
operation of public blockchain technology does not provide for clear responsibility. 
Instead, it explicitly relies on the decentralization of responsibility. Due to their 
influence on determining the means and purposes of BC data processing,  nodes and 
users can be considered controllers (but not only these depending on the BC). Since 
both nodes and users are controllers, the provisions of Art. 26 GDPR on joint controllers 
must be fulfilled. In the case of traditional data processing, the joint responsibility of 
the data controllers has to be regulated in an agreement. However, as there is 
insufficient knowledge of all controllers in public BCs, a contractual sharing of joint 
responsibility is not possible [3]. The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) has 
finally clarified in its most recent Guidelines (see recital 167) that, in such cases, each 
individual controller must comply with the obligations of the GDPR [11]. In a public 
blockchain, data is passed on to an unmanageable group of people and the granting of 
data subject rights is extremely difficult. Therefore, nodes and users will generally not 
be able to meet their obligations [3, 7]. The Schrems II ruling has further complicated 
the issue. The ruling clarified that (joint) data controllers must also ensure compliance 
with the GDPR in the case of transfers of personal data to countries outside the EU that 
 
 
do not have an adequate level of data protection [12]. Since, in a public blockchain, 
every person from any part of the world can become a node or a user, fulfilling this 
requirement is also difficult. 
Second, the GDPR grants the data subjects the right to rectify and erase their data. 
However, the distinctive feature of BC technology is the immutability of the stored 
data, in order to achieve maximum transparency and data integrity [3]. As this brief 
discussion has made clear, there are still challenges with regard to the privacy-
compliant operation of a public BC, which make it necessary to adapt BC architecture 
to the legal requirements. 
Nonetheless, many companies expect disruptive changes due to BC technology. 
Thus, awareness of the challenges posed by DP law has led to an intensive debate. A 
number of recent surveys have been carried out to identify the concerns of the business 
community. A PricewaterhouseCoopers survey [13] of 600 corporate executives from 
15 countries found that 27% considered regulatory uncertainty the biggest barrier to the 
use of BCs. A Bitkom survey [14] of 1,004 companies revealed that 66% regarded DP 
requirements as a challenge. According to Deloitte's survey [1], 32% of 1,488 
companies surveyed named regulatory issues as hindering BC adoption. This study is 
the only one that asked companies whether and to what extent they saw possibilities to 
overcome the DP challenges. Indeed, 83% of respondents indicated that they were very 
or somewhat confident that they would be able to meet the regulatory requirements [1]. 
Such surveys mainly focus on finding out whether companies see DP as a challenge, 
but they do not ask what exactly they regard as challenges or how they will try to 
overcome them.  
Until a few years ago, IS literature considered DP to be guaranteed, e.g. due to the 
anonymity of the nodes [15]. Today, a growing number of papers, mainly in the fields 
of computer science [10, 16] and law [3], acknowledge DP challenges, and search for 
possible solutions. Some of these deal with the challenges in great depth. To the 
authors’ best knowledge, there is no literature on the possible solutions discussed in the 
business world and no literature comparing stakeholder views. 
The German government published its BC strategy in September 2019 [17]. It laid 
down the framework conditions for the further development of the technology and 
announced several dozen measures in five fields of action. The subsequent reactions 
ranged from clear support [18] to skeptical relief [19] and fundamental criticism [20]. 
In particular, the lack of uniform goals and a binding timetable was criticized.   
With regard to DP issues in connection with BC applications, the German 
government stated that it saw no need to amend the GDPR. Instead, the uncertainties 
of developers and users with regard to data protection law were to be addressed using 
existing technical solutions (including hash values, pseudonymization, ZKP) and 
holding a "round table" on the topic of blockchain and data protection [17].  
3 Methodology 
We conducted a text-based, qualitative content analysis (CA) following [21], because 
“it is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts” [21].  
 
 
Unitizing: As the basis for our analysis, we used the document provided by [22], 
containing all the officially published answers given in the consultation process for the 
blockchain strategy of the German government. In total, there were 6,261 answers from 
130 respondents, which we transferred into a machine-readable format.  
Sampling: From this corpus of data, we identified data protection-relevant answers and 
questions by applying a keyword search to the statements. Since the blockchain 
consultation was conducted in German, we decided to use the terms shown in Table 1 
(case insensitive, incl. substrings). These are terms found in the German and English 
version of the GDPR as well as synonyms in the relevant data protection literature. In 
Table 1, we also provide the percentage of mentions of each keyword within questions 
(Q) and given answers (A). We ended up with 537 relevant questions and answers in 
total, which we refer to as statements from now on (8.6%).  
Table 1: Keywords and percentage of mentions in all statements (Q=question, A=answer) 
Keyword % in Q % in A  Keyword % in Q % in A 
Datenschutz 14.90% 35.94%  private Daten 0.00% 0.74% 
Privatsphäre 21.23% 5.40%  DS-GVO 0.00% 0.19% 
personenbez
ogen 
29.24% 18.06%  Privatheit  0.00% 0.13%  
DSGVO 3.91% 22.53%  private data  0.00% 0.03% 
privacy 0.00% 5.96%  personal data 0.00% 0.00% 
GDPR 0.00% 3.72%  Data protection 0.00% 0.00% 
persönliche 
Daten 
0.00% 1.68%     
Coding: Two persons coded the statements. Both were familiar with the subject of data 
protection; the principal coder (C1) had additional technical expertise in BC 
technology. C1 processed all 537 statements and defined the final category set. The 
second coder (C2) processed a representative sample of 50 statements from more than 
ten percent of the respondents, as suggested by [23]. 
C1 applied iterative inductive-deductive coding. Based on our research question, we 
predefined three subject areas, i.e. “problem relevance”, “articulated challenges” and 
“proposed solutions”. In total, 57 codes were identified for each subject area. 
Additionally, C1 always noted the usage domain in which the question was situated. 
After this initial coding, C2 relied on the codes by C1 and processed the coding of 
the representative sample to ensure reproducibility [21]. Our analysis showed a 
moderate strength of agreement, manifesting in a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.53 for intercoder 
reliability.  
Reducing: We applied hybrid card sorting in order to reduce the number of codes and 
created clusters based on insights from literature. For example, [16] and [24] considered 
pruning, Merkle trees, and chameleon hash functions as erasure methods, as all aim at 
(physically) deleting data. This process resulted in a reduction from 57 to 31 categories 
 
 
(Table 2). Finally, we consulted an expert panel of n=8 to check the codes were 
collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive, as suggested by [21]. 
Table 2. Quantitative representation of codes and categories for each subject area 
Group of themes No. of code categories No. of codes 
Problem description 4 5 
Articulated challenges 15 19 
Proposed solutions 8 26 
General remarks 4 7 
Total 31 57 
Inferring: In order to “bridge [...] the gap between descriptive accounts of texts and 
what they mean, refer to, entail, provoke, or cause” [21], we compared the respondents’ 
statements with findings from the literature. This yields important insights, as most 
respondents are generalists rather than BC experts.  
Narrating: We present the procedures and results, theoretical and practical 
contributions, and upcoming questions of the content analysis in the next chapters. 
4 Results 
In this section, we provide a descriptive overview of all DP-related statements of the 
respondents. First, we show how relevant DP issues are for the respondents. Second, 
we present the specific challenges stated and, finally, we give an overview of the 
proposed solutions to these challenges. In total, there were 130 companies and 
organizations, of which 94 (72%) provided DP-relevant answers. Their 537 statements 
form the basis for this analysis. The respondents are active in different industries, with 
a majority in the IT sector (38%), followed by research institutions (18%) and Fintech 
(13%). Although our focus is on companies, the analysis involves different types of 
stakeholders. Based on our analysis, we cannot identify structural differences in the 
answers between the different sectors, as there were not enough data available. The 
available data indicate that the automotive, financial and energy sectors are particularly 
skeptical about the compatibility of data protection and blockchain. In contrast, the 
healthcare and IT sectors are particularly optimistic.1  
4.1 Problem Relevance 
The first subject area represents how relevant companies and organizations assess DP 
in the field of blockchain. The relevance is shown in eight coding categories (Figure 1). 
                                                          
1 Compare the online appendix for a table in which the assessment of how serious the problems 
are and whether there are possible solutions was divided by sector. 
 
 
These results are independent of specific usage domains, but an analysis of the provided 
application domains shows similar results.  
Out of the total of 94 respondents, a majority (81%) agree that DP is a challenge in 
BC applications, whereas only 21 respondents (22%) see no DP challenges, at least in 
some usage domains2. 19 respondents (20%) consider DP issues to be so serious that 
they expect a showstopper effect for companies. This means that they see no possible 
solution to DP issues of BC, either now or in the future. Very few respondents believe 
these challenges will discourage companies from adopting blockchain applications. A 
majority of 66 respondents are confident that solutions to DP issues are possible. About 
one third (29%) of respondents even argue that BC can enhance DP. For example, they 
mention "self-sovereign identity" (7%), which helps users to track and configure how 
their data must be processed [25].  
 
Figure 1. Relevance of data protection issues in blockchain applications in absolute numbers, 
n=94 (own analysis, multiple responses possible)  
4.2 Articulated Challenges 
Guaranteeing the data subject’s rights is seen by 53 respondents as the biggest 
challenge. In Figure 2, we refer to these rights with the heading “grouped”. Of these, 
50 respondents (94%) consider deletion to be the main problem, 38 (72%) say 
rectification and six (11%) see the right of data portability as challenging. 12 
respondents (23%) mention guaranteeing these rights in general as problematic. The 
second most mentioned challenge by 43 respondents (46%) is that all personal data in 
the BC is visible to everyone. The third most frequently mentioned problem was the 
(non-)identifiability of the data controller (31 times, 33%). 15 respondents (16%) 
criticized the current encryption technologies for personal data, fearing they could be 
cracked in the near future. 14 actors (15%) doubted the effectiveness of 
pseudonymization and regard de-pseudonymization as a problem. Seven (7%) 
criticized the security of storage, which is particularly important in the case of possible 
off-chain storage or storage of the keys required for encryption. Four respondents (4%) 
                                                          
2 As the respondents see no challenges in some specific usage domains, the total number of 
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expressed concerns about the integrity or quality of the input data and stated that it is 
difficult to verify the correctness of data relating to objects in the physical world. 
Finally, three respondents (3%) criticized the high computing power requirements of 
zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) and the effectiveness of anonymizing personal data.  
In addition, seven respondents (7%) drew attention to the legal problems arising 
from the transfer and data storage outside the EU. In the same context, seven 
respondents (7%) criticized the unclear legal situation, both with regard to divergent 
legal frameworks worldwide, which made the use of a global BC more difficult, and 
with regard to the - from their perspective - unclear legal situation in the EU. 
 
Figure 2. Overview of articulated challenges (multiple coding possible) 
4.3 Proposed Solutions 
A majority of the respondents believe that solutions to DP issues in blockchain 
technology are generally possible. In the following section, we briefly present the 
proposed solutions that were mentioned by the respondents. 
Figure 3 shows that the majority of respondents (62 or 66%) believed that a solution 
to the DP challenges was already possible using existing technology. This included off-
chain storage in the first place (43 or 46%), closely followed by encryption technologies 
(37 and 39%). 18 actors (19%) considered pseudonymization to be a useful approach. 
The use of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) represented a possible solution for 13 actors 
(14%). Twelve actors (13%) thought that there are possibilities for deleting data. The 
use of existing anonymization methods was mentioned by eleven actors (12%). 
The second most frequently mentioned proposal (38 actors/40%) was to simply 
refrain from storing personal data in a BC. 31 stakeholders (33%) were in favor of 
 
 
restricting access by using a private BC. 29 actors (31%) mentioned legal adjustments. 
Of those, 27 (29%) mention the concretization and amendment of the GDPR, four (4%) 
the creation of legal bases that apply worldwide (4 or 14%), and two (2%) cooperation 
with other countries.  
29 respondents (31%) expressed the opinion that further technical developments and 
standards were necessary to operate BCs in conformity with data protection laws. With 
the help of organizational security measures, such as user roles or data aggregation, a 
solution to DP problems could be found, according to 17 actors (18%). This included 
user roles and rights (9 or 10%), assigning different protection levels to different types 
of data (8 or 9%), and the exclusive storage of data aggregates (3 or 3%). 
 
Figure 3. Overview of proposed solutions (multiple coding possible) 
5 Discussion 
In this section, we compare the articulated challenges and proposed solutions with the 
state of research. The results show that the majority of respondents (81%) consider data 
protection a challenge in BC. However, many of the respondents in the BC consultation 
consider the challenges to be manageable. Our results also show that many respondents 
promote BC technology, whereas others are rather critical or cannot make a generally 
valid statement. Further, our results suggest that many companies and organizations are 
not very familiar with “the BC issue” or have no desire to delve deeper into it. This can 
be seen, for example, in the fact that almost a third of the respondents urged to 
concretize or amend the GDPR and called on public authorities to offer guidelines. 
Whereas publishing guidelines is certainly a realistic option for action (as the recent 
 
 
EDPB guidelines on accountability have shown), amendments of the GDPR are most 
unlikely at this point in time [26]. In the following subsections, we discuss the 
statements articulated by the respondents. 
5.1 General Statements 
Several respondents raise questions concerning information security goals, i.e. 
confidentiality, integrity and availability, which we want to discuss briefly. While 
immutability and distributed storage fulfill integrity and availability requirements; the 
blockchain “is not specifically designed to support or maintain data confidentiality” 
[27]. Although the company Achelos suggests using encryption to tackle these 
problems, encryption cannot prevent internal errors, such as misuse. 
Additionally, a few respondents note that the inserted data is not verified. Thus, data 
quality control is an issue. The literature agrees on that point, as the BC technology 
“does not guarantee or improve data quality” [28]. Neither the respondents nor the 
literature suggest possible solutions. 
Almost one third of the respondents articulate the need for technical developments 
and standards to operate BCs in a DP-compliant manner. According to the company 
DB Systel, there are currently only "trade-offs between security, data protection, 
efficiency, flexibility, platform complexity and user-friendliness for developers" (own 
translation). The literature acknowledges that the prerequisites for successful research 
have been created and it is likely that a large number of new applications will emerge 
in the near future [29].  
Finally, for about one fifth of the respondents, technical solutions do not seem to be 
sufficient at this point of time. Instead, they suggest three types of organizational 
measures: (1) introduction of user roles and rights, (2) allocation of different protection 
levels to different types of data, e.g. medical data, and (3) exclusive storage of data 
aggregates. The literature also discusses such measures for BC applications, e.g. [30] 
find that "organizational measures need to be taken to fulfill the boundary conditions, 
before blockchain can be used successfully". Generally, private BCs can comply with 
these three types of measures, as a central authority can be defined. For (1), a predefined 
data controller could allow new users and assign rights and roles, which could be 
themselves stored in the BC using smart contracts [7]. For (2), it is technically possible 
to assign data categories that define conditions of use and specify a group of privileged 
recipients [3]. [31] describe a method for service providers to carry out data processing 
directly in the user's network without accessing raw data. This can ensure that users can 
only access certain data. At present, there does not seem to be a sufficient solution for 
the (3) measure. Researchers agree that performing privacy-preserving data aggregation 
is challenging due to advancements in data processing using big data and artificial 
intelligence [32].  
5.2 Rights of the Data Subject: Erasure, Rectification and Data Portability 
Problem description: By far the most frequently mentioned problem relates to 
guaranteeing the rights of data subjects to the erasure or rectification of their data. This 
 
 
is hardly possible, because of the immutable nature of BCs. Several researchers agree 
that these are the most pressing points when considering DP in BC applications [24]. 
Another problem mentioned by the respondents is data portability. This calls for data 
being stored in structured, commonly used and machine-readable formats. However, 
there is no standard exchange format in the blockchain [33]. 
Suggested solutions and evaluation: Most respondents suggest off-chain storage. In 
this case, only a reference hash value of the original file will be stored in the BC. As 
hash values are collision-free, changes to the original file can be detected and thus 
transparency achieved, while being able to continue the blockchain [34]. Contrary to 
the original BC idea, the operator must be trusted, since there are ways to change stored 
data afterwards. Such methods are often referred to as redactable blockchains [24]. One 
prominent example mentioned by the respondents are chameleon hash functions, which 
have collision-free algorithms that enable a group of controllers to delete data while 
leaving a “scar” [35]. However, deletion is only possible in permissioned BC 
architectures, because data controllers need to coincide and deletion is an exception 
[24]. Another drawback is the possible identification of a hash value in a small search 
space [36]. For example, a modern graphic card can calculate the double-sha256 hashes 
of all human names (7.6 bn) in under 4 seconds [37]. Thus, there is the need to add 
random data, a so-called “secret”. To identify users as data holders, this secret must be 
transmitted. However, attacks could compromise the transition and intercept the secret. 
To overcome this problem, some respondents suggest Merkle trees, which are used, 
e.g. in the Bitcoin blockchain, to reclaim disk space [9]. These combine hashes of 
different data fields, such as the hash of the name and the hash of the birthdate and 
create a new hash. This results in a tree-like structure. Only the uppermost hash 
(analogous to the tree trunk) is saved in the BC [38], so that no single person can 
identify the original hash. Especially in the Bitcoin BC, Merkle trees are used to verify 
data blocks to ensure that no miner transmits a manipulated financial transaction.  
Zero knowledge proofs (ZKP) represent another solution, which dispenses with the 
release of the "secret". They do not use a person's real data, but rather a proof that the 
datum exists or is correct [39]. In such a way, one could easily check whether a person 
is older than 18, without revealing the actual birthdate. However, there are two 
disadvantages. First, the literature suggests that an attacker could try out all possible 
input values until the proof is verified [40]. Second, the respondents note that ZKP 
require considerable computing power. Whereas the transactions are stored on-chain, 
the computation and storage are performed off-chain.  
Other respondents mentioned tombstones and data revocation keys as deletion 
methods. However, both these methods only mark data as invalid and do not physically 
delete it, as required by Art. 17 GDPR. Here, at first glance, forking seems a solution. 
It presents an irreversible separation from a BC. However, if data changes and deletions 
have to occur frequently, the chain needs to be split very often. This contradicts the 
basic BC idea, since short chains may counteract transparency [41]. The so-called 
pruning is a deletion method already used in the Bitcoin blockchain. Pruning removes 
old and thus no longer needed parts of the chain while maintaining the integrity of the 
whole chain using Merkle trees [9]. However, this can only delete transaction values 
that have been “consumed” (i.e. spent Bitcoin). No other data could be pruned [6].  
 
 
Concerning the right of data portability, it is unlikely that a standard file format will 
evolve in the near future, as lock-in effects are economically advantageous to 
companies. The current diversity of the blockchain market underlines this problem [2]. 
The question also arises as to who should guarantee the rights of those affected (see the 
following subsection).  
5.3 Identification of the Data Controller 
Problem description: To protect the rights of a data subject, the GDPR provides for a 
(joint) data controller who, for example, acts as an addressee for data subjects to assert 
their rights, or who fulfills the transparency requirements of the Articles 13 and 14. One 
third of all respondents were of the opinion that the difficulty in identifying the data 
controller (see also section 2.2) makes it considerably harder to comply with the legal 
requirements.  
Suggested solutions and evaluation: Respondents suggest using a permissioned 
private or consortium blockchain, as the participants are known there. Researchers, 
such as [3], agree with this, even though this contradicts the basic BC idea of 
transparency and distributed responsibility. Nevertheless, in light of recent 
developments in case law and EDPB recommendations, we concur with this 
assessment. In view of the vast number and geographical location of different nodes 
and users, we do not expect that it will be possible to fulfill the data protection 
requirements regarding the obligations of data controllers in a public BC. Alternatively, 
the problem of responsibility could be solved by limiting the personal nature of data to 
a manageable group of actors (see the following subsection on encryption) [3, 7].  
5.4 Encryption 
Problem description: In connection with the above-mentioned problems of identifying 
the data controller and guaranteeing the rights of those affected by data processing, an 
important strand of the debate is devoted to solutions using encryption.  
Suggested solutions and evaluation: Many respondents point out that the DP 
challenges related to erasure could be solved by encryption. The respondents’ 
assumptions sound simple: data would only be considered personal for those actors who 
have the access key. In this regard, eco - the Association of the Internet Industry 
demands that the verified destruction of a decryption key should be considered 
sufficient for anonymization.  
The French Data Protection Authority CNIL agrees with this opinion. However, [3] 
points out the need for further regulatory advice on this issue, as under the current 
conditions, even nodes that do not actually have significant control over the encrypted 
data could still be considered responsible.  
From a technical point of view, encryption is not identical to physical erasure - it 
only makes data inaccessible. In this respect, both respondents and researchers fear that 
current encryption methods could be cracked in the future and data made accessible [7]. 
However, (a)synchronous encryption algorithms such as AES or RSA are commonly 
used to encrypt bulk data [42] and cracking these is very unlikely in practice, as AES-
 
 
256 and RSA-2048 are considered secure for the next decades [43]. However, BC 
creates an immutable technology architecture, which relies on cryptographic 
procedures. In case of an error in a procedure, the entire chain would be affected 
forever. Thus, as long as no further regulatory guidance is provided, only erasure 
methods  as discussed in Section 5.2 could help to overcome the problems.  
5.5 Storage outside the European Union 
Problem description: The GDPR requires that if any personal data is transferred 
outside the EU, it must meet the requirements of Articles 44-49 GDPR. As a public BC 
is distributed among many (unidentifiable) users, personal data could be stored outside 
of the EU, which causes compliance difficulty.  
Suggested solutions and evaluation: The respondents referred to the use of a private 
or consortium blockchain. Indeed, this would solve some challenges, as only EU 
citizens could be allowed to join. However, it would thwart the BC's goal of maximizing 
transparency. While relying on a public chain, geo-blocking could be a solution, but is 
not in accordance with European law [44]. Furthermore, VPN software can easily 
circumvent geo-blocking.3 Apart from the possibilities mentioned above, the transfer 
of data outside the EU is currently an ongoing problem (not only) in the BC context. 
5.6 Data Readability and Writability for BC Participants 
Problem description: Another important challenge articulated by the respondents is 
that all blockchain users can read and write all data, even personal data, as there is no 
possibility of verification for non-transactional data. Here a dilemma arises: while the 
visibility of all data ought to support transparency, readability and writability also raises 
significant DP concerns, because any user can add personal data to the BC. This poses 
a challenge even if limiting responsibility to the owner of the private keys would enable 
DP-compliant operation of a BC. Indeed, other users could enter unencrypted personal 
data into BC at any time and thus invalidate its data protection compliance. 
Suggested solutions and evaluation: Most respondents suggest using access-
restricted (private) blockchains to let only registered users participate. Although this 
could relieve several DP challenges, it runs counter to the BC intention of ensuring full 
transparency. Other respondents suggest a rather pragmatic approach: simply no 
storage of personal data. However, technical or organizational measures cannot fully 
achieve this. Firstly, data that are not personal today, could become so in future [45]. 
Secondly, content filters could be easily circumvented by experienced users, and 
excluding these users is also very difficult [46]. Respondents also discuss 
pseudonymization as an effective method to veil personal references. However, it has 
become relatively easy to re-assign data. For example, [47] de-pseudonymized up to 
60% of the IP addresses used to execute Bitcoin transactions. The literature does not 
provide effective solutions to render de-pseudonymization impossible, as even TOR 
                                                          
3 Please note that this assessment was made before July 16, 2020, when the European 
Court of Justice ruled that the EU-US Privacy Shield is invalid. 
 
 
network users can be identified by their Bitcoin transactions [48]. Another possible 
solution is a Bitcoin mixer, which combines several transactions into a large bitcoin 
pool and then distributes the coins to the receivers [49]. However, the service provider 
still knows the user’s bitcoin address and could de-anonymize data. Furthermore, the 
mixing service could be a honeypot set up by governments to identify users. For the 
same reason, anonymization cannot be guaranteed for all BC applications. Even 
Monero, which claims to be an anonymous cryptocurrency, is prone to de-
anonymization errors [50].  
6 Conclusions and Outlook 
The data protection-related challenges of BC technology are taking center stage for 
many companies in different industry sectors. Despite a broad debate, little was known 
about the concrete challenges facing companies and how they intend to overcome them.  
Our results augment the existing literature in several regards. First, our study 
contributes to undermining the view that DP regulations are an insurmountable hurdle 
to the use of BCs. The number of actors perceiving a challenge (81%) and believing it 
can be overcome (70%) is very similar. Second, our analysis provides insights into 
which challenges the stakeholders regard as particularly important. Immutability is the 
biggest challenge for most respondents. Whereas many answers relate to public BCs 
and guaranteeing data subjects’ rights, some respondents even promote BC as 
improving DP, e.g. via self-sovereign identities. Third, our results also show that the 
majority consider the problems solvable with already available technologies, in 
particular off-chain storage, encryption, pseudonymization and ZKPs. However, a 
comparison with state-of-the-art scientific literature reveals that only off-chain storage 
and encryption are advisable. Finally, a considerable number of actors also demanded 
the use of a private BC, promotion of further technical developments, and 
concretization or modification of the GDPR. These results show that stakeholders are 
aware that there is no silver bullet to overcome DP-related challenges. Instead, solutions 
depend strongly on the specific implementation and use case. Ultimately, our results 
show that most challenges arise in the field of public BCs. Thus, academia should focus 
on solutions here (e.g. chameleon hash functions). Furthermore, computer science 
research could benefit from empirical insights into how BC stakeholders perceive the 
challenges and solutions, and how these coincide with research. Practitioners can 
benefit from the evaluation of solutions to installing a BC architecture that best 
addresses DP demands. Additionally, our results offer important insights for policy 
makers, as they can see what specific challenges companies face and which research to 
support.  
Although we rely on a large sample of 94 stakeholders, it is not representative for all 
industry sectors, since the sample contains only actors who took part in the consultation. 
The quantity and quality of coders is another common criticism of content analysis. 
However, our reliability measure shows moderate strength.  
Future research could make a quantitative analysis of how often the proposed 
solutions are mentioned by stakeholders across all industry sectors. This would also 
 
 
pave the way for sector-specific analyses to find out whether, for example, certain 
sectors see greater challenges, or whether economic actors and researchers hold 
different views.  
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